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NOTES
THE EFFECT OF THE KALANKE DECISION
ON THE EUROPEAN UNION: A DECISION
WITH TEETH, BUT LITTLE BITE
INTRODUCTION
On October 17, 1995, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"),
in Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen,' determined that a Bre-
men, Germany positive discrimination law, which provided for
the recruitment of women in employment areas where women
are under-represented, violated established European
"Community law."2 As a result of this decision, not only is Ger-
many now "facing the vexing question of how to improve
[employment] opportunities for women without putting men at
an unfair disadvantage,"3 but critics in the European Community
fear that other affirmative action programs presently in place
will have to be abandoned.4
Some observers of the European Court of Justice predict
1 Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Bremen, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3051, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 175
(1996) (all further references are to C.M.L.R.) In Kalanke, the issue was whether a
state law implementing a gender quota which required women to receive at least
one-half of public sector jobs was consistent with a European Council Directive
prohibiting discrimination based on gender. Id. at 177. The European Court of Jus-
tice held that the promotion of a female gardener over a male by the Bremen Parks
Department was violative of the directive. Id.; see Robert Rice, Women Job Quotas
"Unlawful". European Court Ruling Raises Doubts About Affirmative Action, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 1995, at 20.
2 Kalanke, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 195.
' Ruth Walker, Germany Vindicates Affirmative Action: Mostly in Theory,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 18, 1996, at 7.
' See Brian Coleman, et al., A Special Background Report on European Union
Business and Politics, WALL ST. J. (Europe), Mar. 28, 1996, at 1.
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that significant, and even radical changes in the law governing
the European Union ("EU") will follow as a result of the Kalanke
decision.5 Such analysts espouse that although Bremen is a
moderately populated city-state, the Kalanke decision could have
implications for the entire EU population.6 Primarily at issue is
whether Kalanke will apply only locally or instead whether its
holding will extend beyond Germany's borders to all the nations
of the EU.
This Note argues that institutional and practical constraints
on the ECJ limit Kalanke's overall effectiveness! Depending
upon the will of the Member States of the EU, decisions such as
Kalanke, which invalidate such state's national laws, may or
may not influence laws of the European Community.
Part I of this Note outlines the principal institutions of the
EU and the fundamental principles underlying the ECJ's estab-
lishment: its structure, procedure, jurisdiction, and the prelimi-
nary ruling system. Part II discusses Community law regarding
women, including the Kalanke decision invalidating the Bremen
law. Part III explains the theory of the supremacy of Commu-
nity law over the laws of the Member States of the EU. Part IV
addresses difficulties pertaining to the ECJ, including its law
making capacity and issues concerning compliance and enforce-
5 See generally Ami Barav, Omnipotent Courts, in II INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS
265 (Deirdre Curtin & Ton Heukels eds. 1994); Kevin A. Swartz, Note, Powerful,
Unique, and Anonymous: The European Court of Justice and Its Continuing Impact
on the Formation of the European Community, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 687 (1994)
(explaining critical role of Court of Justice in establishing legal foundation of Euro-
pean Community).
6 See Rice, supra note 1, at 20 (noting that decision could have far reaching im-
pact and that most EU states have affirmative action programs); Walker, supra note
3. The International Labor Organization, however, urged governments not to over-
react to the Kalanke ruling. See id.; Tom Buerkle, Europe's Court Strikes Down Hir-
ing Quota for Women, INTL HERALD TRIB., Oct. 18, 1995 (asserting that "ruling
[will] have significant impact across Europe, particularly in countries like Austria,
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Italy, and the Netherlands that mandate various types
of positive discrimination"); Suzanne Perry, Commission Proposal Blesses Flexible
Quotas for Jobs, THE REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Mar. 27, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Reuec File ("Some countries-Sweden, for example-allow
'positive discrimination' in favour of members of the under represented sex even if
they are slightly less qualified than candidates of the other sex.").
"The judicial system of protection as conceived by the Treaties has, in practice,
disclosed some flaws, shortcomings or even gaps." Gerhard Bebr, Court of Justice:
Judicial Protection and the Rule of Law, II INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS, supra note 5,
at 303. One such shortcoming was the lack of "protection of individuals against in-
fringements of Community law by the member states." Id.
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ment. Finally, Part V discusses the reactions of the Member
States of the EU to the court's decision in Kalanke.
I. INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The EU was established to develop "economic and social co-
hesion, and economic and monetary union" amongst the Member
States.8 Another objective was "to assert its identity on the in-
ternational scene ... through the implementation of a common
foreign and security policy ... which might lead to a common de-
fence [policy]. "' To advance these goals, four principal institu-
tions were created: The European Parliament, The Council of
Ministers, The European Commission, and The European Court
of Justice. It is important to have a basic understanding of each
of these institutions in order to understand fully the workings of
the ECJ.
A. The European Parliament
The European Parliament ("Parliament") consists of 567
members elected directly by citizens of the EU for five-year
terms." The members of Parliament each represent their re-
spective countries in making decisions and policies." The num-
ber of parliamentary seats for each country is proportional to a
Member State's population: Germany, the largest Member State,
has ninety-nine seats while Luxembourg, the smallest state, has
only six. 2
The European Parliament "is largely consultative and is not
8 TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, art. B, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (c191) 1 (1992), [1992]
1 C.M.L.R. 719 (1992) [hereinafter EU TREATY]; see P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE
TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 6 (6th ed. 1995).
9 EU TREATY art. B; see MATHIJSEN, supra note 8, at 6. The need for an external
identity stems from the role the Community must play in competition with the
United States and Japan. See id. While the Community possesses this international
economic status, it is still working toward gaining a political presence. See id. The
extensive history of the development of the European Union will not be dealt with in
this Note.
10 See MATHIJSEN, supra note 8, at 27. Elections are held "in accordance with
the method of voting decided nationally." Id. at 26. Individuals may simultaneously
serve a national Parliament and the European Parliament, unless national rules
dictate otherwise. See id. at 27.
"1 See Paul H. Vishny, European Union Law: An Introduction, SB04 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 1, 4 (1996).
12 See MATHIJSEN, supra note 8, at 27 (stating main criteria for determining
number of seats in national population). Members of Parliament are affiliated with
nine political groups. See Vishny, supra note 11, at 5.
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a full legislative body as is the case with other parliaments or
the United States Congress."" Although the European Council
must consult the Parliament on certain important matters,
opinions rendered by Parliament are not binding upon the
Council.14 Parliament does possess, however, a limited veto
power over certain Council decisions. 5 Similarly, the Council
may also be required to pass a proposal that Parliament ap-
proves.16
B. The European Commission
The European Commission ("Commission") consists of
twenty full-time public servants appointed by Member State
governments for five-year terms. 7 Commission members "act
independently and do not take instructions from their own gov-
ernments."'8 They embrace neutrality in favor of acting on be-
half of the EU.
The Commission has a duty to ensure" 'the proper function-
ing and development of the Common Market ... ,,9 It prepares
recommendations and opinions on Community law and initiates
'3 Id.; see T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 33
(3d ed. 1994) (stating that in some cases Parliament has extensive rights, while in
others Parliament only has right to be consulted).
14 See MATHIJSEN, supra note 8, at 30. While the Council is not bound by Par-
liament's decisions, the acts must mention "the fact that Parliament was consulted."
Id. The Council need not indicate, however, "whether the opinion was favourable or
not." Id.
15 See Lisa B. White, Comment, The Enforcement of European Union Law: The
Role of the European Court of Justice and the Court's Latest Challenge, 18 HOUSTON
J. INT'L L. 833, 841 (1996) (citing GEORGE BERMANN, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 5 (1993)). The Council must adopt a "common posi-
tion" and send it to Parliament. See id. (citing BERMANN, supra, at 84). The Council
is obligated to pass the common position if Parliament approves of it and if Parlia-
ment disapproves, the measure can only be passed through unanimous agreement.
See id. (citing BERMANN, supra, at 84).
16 See id. (citing BERMANN, supra note 15, at 84).
17 See Vishny, supra note 11, at 6. "The number of members may be altered by
the Council." Id. The members of the Commission have to be nationals of the Mem-
ber States and each State must have one but cannot have more than two individuals
on the Commission. See D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW & INSTITUTIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 185 (4th ed. 1987).
'8 Vishny, supra note 11, at 6. They are "full-time public servants" and repre-
sent the neutrality towards their home governments necessary to act on behalf of
the Union. Id.
19 Id. (citing TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, art.
155, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC TREATY]).
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most EU legislation." The Commission as the" 'guardian of the
Treaty,' "21 is charged with guaranteeing the enforcement of the
European Union treaty, "including the bringing of enforcement
actions before the European Court of justice."22  Commission
members are responsible for administering Community finances,
negotiating international agreements and representing the
Community both inside and outside of its borders.2 Finally, the
Commission "embodies and represents the common or Commu-
nity interest and is responsible for ensuring that this interest
prevails when decisions are taken by Member States, the Council
or natural and legal persons alike." 4
C. The European Council
The European Council ("Council") consists of representatives
from the governments of each Member State.2 The primary role
of the Council is to "ensure co-ordination of the general economic
policies of the Member States."26 As representatives of the Mem-
ber States working in a Community institution, "the members of
the Council act on instruction from their [respective] govern-
ment[s], "27 while at the same time acting in the interest of the
European Community.2 Council membership "varies in accor-
dance with the subject matter to be discussed."29 Council meet-
ings are private and meeting records are kept confidential."
The Council represents the interests of each of the Member
20 See id.
21 White, supra note 15, at 839.
2 Vishny, supra note 11, at 6. "The Commission has the responsibility for in-
vestigating and initiating proceedings against member states who do not abide by
EU law. This body may settle these conflicts out of court, or the member states can
force the Commission to file suit in court." White, supra note 15, at 839 (citations
omitted).
2 See White, supra note 15, at 839 (citations omitted).
24 MATHIJSEN, supra note 8, at 67.
25 See id. at 50 (citing TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, art.
146, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC
TREATY]). Representatives from the ministerial level of government are authorized
to bind the member state. See id.
2' EC TREATY art. 145.
7 MATHIJSEN, supra note 8, at 50.
28 See id.
29 Vishny, supra note 11, at 5. The Council member typically will be the
"minister whose portfolio includes the subject under discussion." Id.
20 See id.
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States3' and is the principal legislative body of the EU.32 "It acts
on proposals referred to it by the Commission"3 3 and "issues
regulations, directives, and decisions based on [Commission]
drafts."" The Council allocates votes to Member States based
upon their population size: the largest state receives ten votes
and the smallest state receives two.3' Depending upon the nature
of proposal that is before the Council, enactment may require a
mere majority vote, a two-thirds majority vote, a qualified major-
ity vote," or a unanimous vote.37 The Council may act, however,
only when the Treaty of the European Union expressly provides
it with the power to do so."
Directives are one of the Council's primary legislative tools.
The purpose of a directive is to "lay[] down an objective" and de-
tail a common goal to be achieved among the Member States. 9
Government officials of each state "are left the 'choice of form
and method[]' ,,o necessary to achieve the particular objective set
forth by the Council.4 ' The ECJ has held specifically that
31 See MATHIJSEN, supra note 8, at 51. "[The Commission's proposal and the
opinion of Parliament should ensure that the Community's interests are sufficiently
taken into consideration." Id. at 57-58.
3' See Vishny, supra note 11, at 5.
33 Id.
34 See White, supra note 15, at 838 (citing P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (5th ed. 1990)). The Council also "delegates certain
powers to the Commission" and "has the power to ratify treaties after consulting the
[European] Parliament." Vishny, supra note 11, at 5.
3' See id.
36 See MATHIJSEN, supra note 8, at 52-53. A qualified majority vote presently
would consist of 54 of the 76 votes in the Council. See id.
37 See id. at 51. Most important decisions require a unanimous vote. See id.
Unanimity is required to enlarge the European Community or to deviate from the
treaty. See Vishny, supra note 11, at 5. Additionally, all must agree on matters re-
latin to taxes and the free movement of people within the Community. See id.
See MATHIJSEN, supra note 8, at 57. "[Tlhe Council may, acting unanimously
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting Parliament, take the ap-
propriate measures." Id. (citing EC TREATY art. 235).
3' HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 210. See EC TREATY art. 189 ("A directive shall be
binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each member state to which it is ad-
dressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and meth-
ods.").
40 ELEANOR SHARPSTON, INTERIM AND SUBSTANTIVE RELIEF 8 (1993) (quoting
EC TREATY at art. 189) (alteration in original).
41 See id. (finding that "detailed implementation remains the province of the
Member States"); EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AFTER 1992 4 (Ralph M. Folsom, et
al. eds., 1993) ("It is then left to the Member States to implement the Directive in
whatever way is appropriate to their national legal system."); HARTLEY, supra note
13, at 210 (noting that directive only dictates desired result while Member States
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"Member States [are] free to implement Directives by means ap-
propriate to their domestic situations."42 The treaty makers in-
tended to ensure uniformity in legislative results but also
wanted to permit the states diversity in procedure so as to guar-
antee effective compliance with a particular objective.
Pursuant to the treaties, the Council's directives were not
meant to be "directly effective";4  that is, individuals could not
rely on Community provisions when bringing actions before na-
tional courts." The direct effect principle states that "certain
provisions of [EU] law may confer rights or impose obligations on
individuals which national courts are bound to recognise and en-
force." 5 Instead of providing for such direct effect, however, the
treaty makers determined that directives would have "indirect
effect." This term, although not actually used in practice by
European courts, signifies "the doctrine that Community provi-
sions ... must be taken into account by national courts when in-
terpreting national legislation."46 In essence, almost the same
result under both a direct and indirect effect is achieved despite
the subtle difference in their interpretations.4"
Despite the rather clear intent of the treaty makers regard-
ing the effect of Council Directives, the ECJ has previously ruled
are free to choose particular means to reach objective).
42 Taline Aharonian, Equal Value in the European Union: Fiction or Reality?, 2
BUFF. J. INT'L L. 91, 104 (1995).
43 HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 210.
4 See id. at 195. Only when a provision is directly effective can individual rights
be upheld by the Member Courts. See id. The definition of "directly effective" "refers
to rights, rather than to obligations, and to rights enforceable by individuals, rather
than by public authorities." Id.; see SHARPSTON, supra note 40, at 11. Individuals
can rely on the provisions "either against other private individuals or companies or
against the organs of government of the Member State itself." Id. "Directives cannot
be enforced against another natural or legal person in private litigation." Id. at 13.
4" NEILL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 177 (2d ed. 1994). The principle of direct effect was first established in
the 1963 case of Van Gend en Loos. See id. The Court has since expanded its scope
to include most secondary legislation. See id.
48 HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 222. Although the label is not used specifically by
the ECJ, it is applied mainly to directives, which "cannot directly impose obligations
on individuals." Id. The distinction between direct effect of laws and directives must
be understood. Direct effect means that a provision creating rights need not be re-
enacted in national legislation but is accepted wholesale as governing law. See W.
RAWLINSON & M. CORNWELL-KELLY, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW § 2.15 (1994). In
contrast, directives need "to be the subject of national legislative action to imple-
ment them." Id. The distinction has blurred, however, as courts have held both to be
directly applicable. See id.
47 See HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 222.
1997]
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that such directives can be directly effective." Through a series
of cases, the principle emerged that "directives may contain
terms that are sufficiently precise and unconditional of them-
selves to create rights."49 The Court deemed it necessary to find
that directives could be directly effective because of the national
governments' failure to implement various Community direc-
tives." Such direct effect requires that the courts of the Member
States enforce issued Community directives.5 If the ECJ instead
had determined that these directives ought not be directly effec-
tive, such directives could then only be enforced "by means of an
action brought in the European Court by the Commission (or by
another Member State)."52 The direct effect doctrine for Com-
munity directives has two significant consequences; it protects
the Commission from political pressure and it imposes a burden
upon national courts to enforce these Community directives. 3
Whether national courts will meet this enforcement burden,
however, is yet to be seen.
D. The European Court of Justice
The ECJ54 was created by three Treaties establishing the
48 See id. at 211; see also Van Duyn v. Home Office, 4117, 1974 E.C.R. 1337,
[1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 347 (Ch. 1974) (Eng.); SHARPSTON, supra note 40, at 12
("Directives might be thought - since article 189 of the Treaty leaves their detailed
implementation to the Member State - to be incapable of creating rights on which
individuals may rely before the national courts.").
'9 SHARPSTON, supra note 40, at 12; see Marshall v. Southampton and S.W.
Hampshire Area Health Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 723, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688 (1986). The
Court in Marshall held that "wherever the provisions of a directive appear, as far as
their subject matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, those
provisions may be relied upon by an individual against the state where that state
fails to implement the directive in national law or where it fails to implement the
directive correctly." Id.
'o See HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 213 (stating that member states have always
been negligent in implementing community directives).
51 See id.
52 Id.; see EC TREATY arts. 169-71.
See HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 213 n.55 (detailing Netherlands study and
failure of member states to comply in timely manner).
" The ECJ is based in Luxembourg. See NUGENT, supra note 45, at 220. There
are two-tiers to the European court system: the Court of Justice of the European
Communities and below it, the Court of First Instance. See Carl 0. Lenz, The Role
and Mechanism of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure, 18A FORDHAM INTL L.J. 388,
390 (1994). A vital part of the EC Treaty is the cooperation between the Courts of
the member states and the Court of Justice in the interpretation of Community Law
in the preliminary ruling procedure. See id.
This Note will focus exclusively on the Court of Justice because it is solely re-
[Vol. 71:591
19971 THE EFFECT OF KALANKE DECISION
European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC")," the European
Economic Community ("EEC")56 and the European Atomic En-
ergy Community ("Euratom").57 The founders of the Community
clearly understood the need for a centralized court, particularly
"because broad areas of the Community legal order [were] decen-
tralized."58 The result was the ECJ, which "is the single institu-
tion exercising judicial authority within the Communities ..
1. Fundamental Principles
The fundamental duties of the ECJ are to ensure the en-
sponsible for determining preliminary rulings. "After the court settles the disputed
issue of law, the national court which requested the preliminary ruling must apply
the Court's ruling to the facts of the case." Swartz, supra note 5, at 693.
" TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr. 18,
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC TREATY]. The ECSC treaty was signed in
Paris by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (the
six founding members) on April 18, 1951, creating inter alia, the European Court of
Justice. See L. NEVILLE BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1 (4th ed. 1994); NUGENT, supra note 45, at 449.
" EEC TREATY.
V TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EURATOM TREATY]. The Treaties establishing the
EEC and the Euratom, also known as the Treaties of Rome, were signed on March
25, 1957. BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 55, at 1. It was determined that there
should be a single Court to serve all three Communities. Id. at 1-2. The number of
nations under three Communities was increased to include Denmark, Ireland and
the United Kingdom in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, id. at 2,
and Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995. The Future of Europe, THE INDEP.
(London), Mar. 28, 1996, at 14. See K.P.E. LASOK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1 (2d ed. 1994) (reciting history of European
treaties establishing ECJ). These treaties have been amended and supplemented by
the Single European Act ("SEA"), signed on February 17th and 18th of 1986, 1987
O.J. (L 169) 1 and by the Treaty on European Union ("EU TREATY"), signed at
Maastricht on February 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1. This note uses the term
"European Community" [EC] to refer to the political, economic and legal entity cre-
ated under the EEC Treaty, as amended by the SEA and the EU Treaty.
Lenz, supra note 54, at 391. "A supranational entity such as the Community
cannot function effectively unless there is a single court with power to decide all
questions of Community law." HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 238.
E9 BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 55, at 2. In exerting its judicial authority, the
ECJ has developed two doctrines which have been essential to the Community's ju-
risprudential development: direct effect and treaty supremacy. The doctrine of di-
rect effect holds that rules of EC law which are clearly defined are self executory
and enforceable in the national courts of the member states. Treaty supremacy is
similar to the American notion of federal preemption. The doctrine of treaty su-
premacy permits Community law to usurp any national law in areas governed by an
EC treaty. See Steven A. Bibas, The European Court of Justice and the U.S. Su-
preme Court: Parallels in Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence, 15 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 253,257 (1992).
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forcement, consistent application, and uniform interpretation60 of
Community law. 1 The Court also acts as a referee between the
Community's various institutions.62 The policy objectives of the
Court focus on "the promotion of European integration" and gen-
erally include strengthening and expanding the overall powers of
the Community.'
2. Structure of the Court
Fifteen judges are appointed by Member States to preside
over the Court for staggered six-year terms." The judges vote by
secret ballot to elect a fellow judge to be President of the Court
for a three-year, renewable term.6 The President's duties in-
clude presiding over full sessions of the Court and directing ju-
dicial and administrative business.67 A full court hears all of the
actions brought by the Member States or Community institu-
60 See EC TREATY art. 164 ("The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the inter-
pretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed."). The Court is the only
institution in the legal system of the Community entrusted with the duty of inter-
preting Community law. See Lenz, supra note 54, at 389.
61 Community law is made up of the three treaties, the legal acts of the institu-
tions such as regulations, directives, and decisions "in international agreements
concluded by the Community with non-Member States or external organizations,
and in certain general principles of law that the Court of Justice has deduced from
the treaties and the legal systems of the Member States." Lenz, supra note 54, at
391 n.10.
62 See HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 57.
Id. at 86. Proponents of the EEC have noted that the easiest way to unify the
hearts and minds of the European people is to foster their common economic inter-
est. See Bibas, supra note 59, at 254 (advocating increased social activism on part of
ECJ).
Judges and advocates-general are elected through a " 'common accord'," or
unanimous agreement, of the member governments. See D. FREESTONE & J.S.
DAVIDSON, THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 133
(1988) (quoting EC TREATY art. 167). Court membership is available to any person
"whose independence is beyond doubt and who possesses the qualifications required
for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who
are jurisconsults of recognized competence." EC TREATY art. 167.
6 See HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 58. There is no age for retirement and judges
are frequently re-appointed to their posts. Id. There is one judge for each member
state-Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, It-
aly, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
The purpose of staggering terms is so that approximately six judges and three advo-
cates general can be elected or replaced every third year. See FREESTONE &
DAVIDSON, supra note 64, at 133.
" See HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 58.
67 See id. The President may not vote in decisions, which are reached by a ma-
jority vote. See id.
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tions. 5 The ECJ will also hear actions if a Member State or
Community institution is a party to, or an intervenor in, a pro-
ceeding, or has submitted a reference for a preliminary ruling.
69
In order to foster the sense of "Europeanism" and independ-
ence from Member States sought throughout the EC, judges are
required to free themselves from allegiance to their respective
countries and be neutral participants in the judicial process70 and
must also promise to uphold the secrecy of any Court delibera-
tions.71 To further protect the judges from various national pres-
sures, the Court issues only one judgment and does not submit
any concurring or dissenting opinions.7"
The Court has six Advocates-General7" whose duties include
making reasoned submissions74 to assist the ECJ in deciding
those matters brought before it.75 The Advocate-General repre-
sents neither the Community nor any individual states when
making an opinion. Rather, the Advocate-General speaks for the
overall public interest in order to reflect the principles of impar-
tiality and independence upon which the Court is founded.76 The
68 Id. The quorum for a full Court is seven. See id.
c9 HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 59.
70 See EC TREATY art. 167; ECSC TREATY art. 32(b); EuRATOM TREATY art. 139.
In fact, "the Court is generally regarded as one of the most 'European-minded' insti-
tutions in the Community." HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 59. "Though they may be
influenced by the different traditions of their respective legal systems, they have
never been accused of taking national advantage into account .... Id.
71 See HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 58.
72 See id. at 59. In addition to these steps, judges are "sworn not to -discuss any
proceedings which take place outside of the public's view." Swartz, supra note 5, at
692.
73 See HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 60. The function of the Advocates-General
"has no parallel in the English legal system, though it is similar to that of a commis-
saire du gouvernement in the French Conseil d'Etat." Id.
7" The Advocate-General is not limited to the arguments made by the parties.
See id. at 62.
7. See EC TREATY art. 166 ("It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General, acting
with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned
submissions on cases brought before the Court of Justice, in order to assist the
Court .... "); ECSC TREATY art. 32(s); EURATOM TREATY art. 138.
76 FREESTONE & DAVIDSON, supra note 64, at 136 ("[Tlhe advocate-general's
opinion ... is purely personal and does not represent the views of either the Com-
munity, the Member States or the Court ...."); see HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 60. It
should be noted, however, that an Advocate-General may be susceptible to political
pressure exerted by their home countries. The opinions submitted by the advocate-
general are signed, unlike the Court's opinions which are anonymous. This absence
of secrecy has led some to speculate that Advocates-General may entertain favorit-
ism for their home countries on this issue, particularly when re-election occurs
every three years. See, e.g., Swartz, supra note 5, at 692.
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opinion of the Advocate-General, which is not binding on the
Court, is presented after the parties have completed their own
submissions. The judges seriously consider the Advocate-
General's opinion, which is printed along with the Court's hold-
ing in the law reports.77
3. Procedure
7 1
Since the European Union is a multilingual organization,
Community institutions must be capable of meeting the com-
munication needs of all the Member States.79 Judgments and
other legal documents of the ECJ are translated by a Translation
Directorate into each of the Court's official languages." Court
proceedings are conducted in the "language of the case,"8 which,
in preliminary rulings, is the language of the national court or
tribunal that made the original reference.82
The ECJ typically does not attempt to determine the actual
subjective intent of legislators when interpreting Community
Treaties and legislation.83 This decisionmaking process is based
7 HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 61. The duty of the advocate-general is to sum-
marize the arguments of the parties and suggest their own solution to the matter.
This solution is to be based on the jurisprudence of the Court and is, of course, re-
quired to be impartial. See JOXERRAMON BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL REASONING OF
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 13 (1993).
78 "The procedure in the European Court is laid down partly in the Statutes of
the Court ... and partly in the Rules of Procedure. The latter are drawn up by the
Court itself, but have to be approved by the Council .... They were originally mod-
eled on those of the International Court of Justice." HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 69
(citations omitted).
71 See id. at 75.
8 See id. at 63. Interpreters are not allowed into the deliberation room in order
to maintain the secrecy of the judges' discussions. Id. at 80. Therefore, to facilitate
communication, the ECJ unofficially has adopted French as the working language of
the court. Id. There are nine official Court languages derived from the Member
States-Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, and
Spanish. HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 78. Irish is recognized by the Court, but not as
an official Court language. See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 55, at 19.
8' HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 78. The "language of the case" may be selected
from one of the official court languages. In theory, this choice is left to the applicant.
"However, if the defendant is a member state or a person or corporation subject to a
member state the procedural language will be the official language of that state."
See LASOK AND BRIDGE, supra note 17, at 90. The Court may permit the use of an
official language that is foreign to both parties if they both make such a request. Id.
82 See HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 78; LASOKAND BRIDGE, supra note 17, at 90.
8See HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 85. Due to various legislative backgrounds
and legal traditions of the member states, attempts to find a consensus regarding
Community law have proven elusive. See LASOK AND BRIDGE, supra note 17, at 75-
83. This reality has led to an attempt by the Court to apply a comparative approach
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on the fundamental belief that after arduous negotiations by the
legislators, there may exist a consensus only as to the actual
words used and not necessarily to their meaning.' Finally, al-
though no official doctrine of stare decisis exists in the ECJ, the
Court almost always follows its previous decisions.'
4. Jurisdiction
The treaties grant the ECJ only limited jurisdiction8 over
the fifteen states in the European Union including: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. The ECJ also maintains jurisdiction
over those states in the European Economic Area ("EEA").
8 7
The Court "has jurisdiction to give binding interpretations
on Community law" and "has exclusive jurisdiction to declare
Community acts invalid."' An action may come before the Court
in one of two ways: 1) a direct action-those begun in the Euro-
pean Court, and 2) those actions begun in national courts from
to legal issues, demonstrating the Court's autonomous nature. Id. at 149-50.
" See HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 85; see id. at 80 (noting that "[ilt is almost
impossible for even the best translator to find a form of words with exactly the same
meaning as the original" and that "translations ... can never be exact"). Some even
argue that the Court "prefers to interpret texts on the basis of what it thinks they
should be trying to achieve; it moulds the law according to what it regards as the
ends of the Community." Id. at 85.
' See id. at 83; see also Lenz, supra note 54, at 403 (noting that judgment of
Court of Justice constitutes precedent which Court will follow in analogous case).
However, the Court considers itself free to decide in a different way the same legal
point if it arises between different parties and in a different context. LASOK AND
BRIDGE, supra note 17, at 126-31. This may be a reflection of the civil law heritage
of some member states, most notably France, whose legal system expressly prohib-
its the reliance upon precedent. This view is based upon the belief that "judicial de-
cisions are not a formal source of law at all." See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 55,
at 343.
" EC TREATY art. 4; EURATOM TREATY art. 3. The European Court shall only
"act within the limits of the powers conferred on it by this Treaty." Id.
"7 See Gerard O'Dwyer, Court Voids Law to Aid Women, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28,
1996, at 1. "The EEA was created in 1993 as a medium to foster closer trade links
between states in the European Union and those of the European Free Trade Asso-
ciation .... Id. The EEA agreement "was signed in 1993 by which the internal mar-
ket of the EU was extended to Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden."
Vishny, supra note 11, at 4.
"s Lenz, supra note 54, at 392 [emphasis omitted]. Article 173 of the EC Treaty
empowers the court to review and set aside community acts. See EC TREATY art.
173. "[National courts do not have the power to declare acts of the Community in-
stitutions invalid." Lenz, supra note 54, at 392 (citation omitted).
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which a reference for a preliminary ruling is made to the ECJ.89
The Court will, for direct actions, grant a non-appealable judg-
ment and any appropriate remedies." For preliminary rulings
however, the Court renders a ruling to the national court, and it
is the national court which ultimately decides the case. This
ECJ ruling is solely, however, a decision of an abstract legal is-
sue, despite the fact that it is both binding and not subject to ap-
peal.9
5. Preliminary Rulings
The ECJ, if requested by a national court,92 will provide a
preliminary ruling regarding a question of Community law that
is relevant to a genuine dispute.93 The Community treaties pro-
vide that all national courts and tribunals have the option to re-
quest a preliminary ruling by the ECJ, and those courts from
which there is no judicial appeal are required to solicit such rul-
ings. 94 Furthermore, only a national court may bring a reference
89 HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 66.
90 See id. at 61. This procedure has received criticism. Id.
9' Id. at 66. "The national court decides any relevant questions of fact and then
applies the law-including relevant provisions of Community law as interpreted by
the European Court-to the facts; it also exercises any discretion it may have as to
the remedy to be given." Id.
9'2 The number of references made to the Court has been regularly increasing.
Lenz, supra note 54, at 407. By the end of 1993, over 2700 references had been made
to the Court for a preliminary ruling. Id. There is, however, a substantial backlog of
cases before the court. SHARPSTON, supra note 40, at 26.
93 See Lenz, supra note 54, at 397. The court will not issue advisory opinions.
Id.; see also Case 338/85, Fratelli Pardini SPA v. Ministero del Commercio con
L'estero and Banca Toscana, 1988 E.C.R. 2041, 2975. In Fratelli Pardini, the Court
held that:
[a] national court is not empowered to bring a matter before the Court by
way of a reference for a preliminary ruling unless a dispute is pending be-
fore it in the context of which it is called upon to give a decision capable of
taking into account the preliminary ruling. Conversely, the Court of Jus-
tice has no jurisdiction to hear a reference for a preliminary ruling when,
at the time it is made, the procedure before the court making it has already
been terminated.
Id.
, See EC TREATY art. 177 ("Where any such question is raised in a case pending
before a court or tribunal of a member-State against whose decisions there is no ju-
dicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter be-
fore the Court of Justice."); see also NUGENT, supra note 45, at 228 (recognizing that
preliminary rulings now constitute largest category of cases that come before ECJ);
Lenz, supra note 54, at 393-94 (noting that "all courts and tribunals ... are entitled
to make references, so that a decision at the European level may take place even at
first instance"). Typically, the national court will stay the proceedings while making
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before the ECJ; the parties involved in the case are precluded
from doing so.9" In fact, parties may not even request a revision
or an interpretation of the ECJ's final judgment. A national
court however, may bring a second reference before the Court in
order to clarify its ruling on a particular matter.96
Typically, three different types of issues come before the
Court: (1) issues regarding the interpretation of Community law;
(2) effects of various provisions on national legal systems; and (3)
issues involving the validity of Community measures.97 Guaran-
teeing uniformity of Community law among the Member States
is the primary goal of the preliminary ruling system." The
Court's judgment regarding any questions concerning Commu-
nity law is conclusive.99 Once the ECJ makes a reference, the
Member State court must abide by the Court's ruling on both the
validity and interpretation of the Community law question,
10
even though the function of the ECJ in making preliminary rul-
ings is merely to assist the national court in making judg-
the reference to the ECJ. See Lenz, supra note 54, at 399.
9 See SHARPSTON, supra note 40, at 16-17 (noting that parties do not have right
to request preliminary ruling, nor may they stop court from requesting one);
HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 73 (commenting that "since strictly speaking, there are
no parties ... the proceedings are not regarded as non contentious").
s6 See SHARPSTON, supra note 40, at 16-17.
97 See EC TREATY art. 177. The Court of Justice is to have "jurisdiction to give
preliminary rulings concerning- (a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity
and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the ECB; (c)
the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council,
where those statutes so provide." Id.
08 See id. at 97 (noting that ECJ is competent to pronounce authoritatively on
questions of Community law and procedure not only enables it to ensure uniform
interpretation and application of Community law in all member states but also al-
lows national courts to seek and obtain authoritative guidance on such points before
deciding disputes); See NUGENT, supra note 45, at 228 (finding that preliminary
rulings "help to ensure that national courts make legally 'correct' judgements [sic]
... [and] promote the uniform interpretation and application of EU law in the mem-
ber states").
' See LASOK AND BRIDGE, supra note 17, at 89. Technically, the ECJ is sup-
posed to make a determination on points of Community law that are unclear to the
member states. Having settled the point of law, the national court will then apply
the rule to the facts of the case. In practice, however, this process is not so clearly
demarcated. The ECJ often "becomes quite involved in the facts of the case and
makes it clear how the national court should finally decide the case." See Swartz,
supra note 5, at 693.
100 LASOK AND BRIDGE, supra note 17, at 136-37. In fact, "[a] preliminary ruling
made at the request of a court of first instance binds national courts with appellate
jurisdiction and is sufficient reason for any other national court faced with the same
issue of community law to decide it in the same way." Id. at 107. Its decision is
binding on the referring court regarding the issues raised for adjudication. Id.
1997]
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ments.'' When the ECJ renders a final judgment on a "reference
for a preliminary ruling, the court that made the reference and
all other courts that are to rule on the same matter are bound by
the operative part of the judgment."' ° Some argue, however,
that the preliminary reference system has caused the ECJ to
maintain a weaker position than a typical supreme court in a
federation. National courts are deemed to be "not subordinate to
the European Court, but co-equal: the relationship is not one of
hierarchy, but of co-operation." 3 This statement further sug-
gests that the ECJ may not be as powerful as other supreme
courts.
II. COMMUNITY LAW REGARDING WOMEN
A. Economic Reality of Women in the European Union
Two important objectives of the European Union are to pro-
mote improved working conditions and to increase the standard
of living among Community members."°  These intentions in-
clude the goal of "strengthening the economic independence of
women."'0 5 Article 119 of the EC Treaty, mandating "equal pay
for equal work," was enacted to help achieve this end.' 6
10 See HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 73. There are no "parties" before the court in
preliminary rulings and "the proceedings are not regarded as contentious." Id.
102 Lenz, supra note 54, at 403. "The national court[, however,] is not obliged to
apply Community law-it may eventually decide the case on other grounds-but if it
does apply it, it is bound by the European Court's ruling." HARTLEY, supra note 13,
at 301. See Deirdre Curtin & Kamiel Mortelmans, Application and Enforcement of
Community Law by the Member States: Actors in Search of a Third Generation
Script, in II INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS 425 (noting that "national courts are ... re-
garded as 'partners in the battle for judicial review' as well as partners in the battle
for truly effective national remedies").
103 HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 266. See also LASOK AND BRIDGE, supra note 17,
at 97 (noting that "[dlivision of competence between the ECJ and the referring court
or tribunal is not based ... on any hierarchical superiority of the Court but rather on
a mutual exclusivity of their respective jurisdictions"). Some commentators, how-
ever, believe the ECJ considers itself superior to the courts of the member states.
See Swartz, supra note 5, at 702. "[Tjhe Court sees its role ... as a version of a su-
preme court whose function is to standardize the interpretation of Community legis-
lation among Member States." Id.
104 EC TREATY art. 2.
'o' Gina L. Ziccolella, Comment, Marshall II: Enhancing the Remedy Available
to Individuals for Gender Discrimination in the EC, 18A FORDHAM INTL L.J. 641,
641-42 (1994).
'06 EC TREATY art. 119. France proposed Article 119, "largely to ensure that its
business enterprises, which were bound by the French Constitution to provide equal
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After its enactment, however, Member States failed to apply
Article 119 in a uniform and consistent manner. °7 Thus, the
Commission enacted the "Equal Pay Directive" 8 requiring
Member States to implement measures that eliminate unequal
pay for women holding the same job position as men."0 9 On its
face, the Equal Pay Directive appeared to be a progressive
measure which would help improve the economic reality and
inequality women face. However, it soon became apparent that
in order for this directive to be effective, women would also have
to obtain the opportunity to gainfully compete in the European
pay for women, should not be at a competitive disadvantage compared with firms in
other Member States that did not require equality in pay." See Ziccolella, supra note
105, at 642 n.6; see also Aharonian, supra note 42, at 96 (finding that "[ilnitial
Member States who already had pay equity laws in their legislations feared that
they would be at a competitive disadvantage to potential future Member States
without such laws").
107 Elena Noel, Prevention of Gender Discrimination Within the European Un-
ion, Vol. 9, No.2, N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 77, 80 (1996).
108 Council Directive 75/117, 1975 O.J. (L 45) 19. The Directive states, in part,
that:
Whereas implementation of the principle that men and women should re-
ceive equal pay contained in Article 119 of the Treaty is an integral part of
the establishment and functioning of the common market;
Whereas it is primarily the responsibility of the Member States to ensure
the application of this principle by means of appropriate laws, regulations
and administrative provisions ...
Whereas differences continue to exist in the various Member States de-
spite the efforts made to apply the resolution of the conference of the
Member States of December 30, 1961 on equal pay for men and women and
whereas, therefore, the national provisions should be approximated as re-
gards application of the principle of equal pay. HAS ADOPTED THIS
DIRECTIVE:
Article 1: The principle of equal pay for men and women outlined in Article
119 of the Treaty, hereinafter called 'principle of equal pay', means, for the
same work or for work to which equal value is attributed, the elimination
of all discrimination on grounds of sex with regard to all aspects and con-
ditions of remuneration.
In particular, where a job classification system is used for determining pay,
it must be based on the same criteria for both men and women and so
drawn up as to exclude any discrimination on grounds of sex.
Article 2: Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems
such measures as are necessary to enable all employees who consider
themselves wronged by failure to apply the principle of equal pay to pursue
their claims by judicial process after possible recourse to other competent
authorities.
Id.
109 See Noel, supra note 107, at 81. Member States were given one year to com-
ply. Id. at 82.
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workforce."' Women's economic independence could not
strengthen simply by ensuring them equal pay at the workforce's
lowest echelon. Rather, there needed to be equal access to all
levels of employment for men and women."
In response to the Equal Pay Directive's ineffective method
of fostering equal access to employment for women, the Council
of Ministers developed a Social Action Program."' The Council
passed several directives to facilitate this equal access process,
including Council Directive No. 76/207, the "Equal Treatment
Directive" ("ETD"), 3 which mandates equal working conditions
and dismissal policies for the sexes."' The ETD also requires
that Member States develop a judicial process through which
alleged victims of gender discrimination may pursue their
claims."' Moreover, Member States are allowed "to adopt meas-
110 Id. at 84.
.. JOHN A. USHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 369 (3d. ed. 1993) (stating that "[n]o treaty article provides expressly
for the application of the principle of equal treatment of men and women, save in
relation to pay").
112 Ziccolella, supra note 105, at 644.
13 Council Directive 76/207, 1976 O.J. (L 39/40) (acting pursuant to art. 235 of
EC Treaty). The Directive was designed to give effect to Article 119 (equal pay) of
the EC Treaty.
114 Ziccolella, supra 105, at 645. See Council Directive 76/207, art. 5, 1976 O.J.
(L39/40). Article 5 provides that:
1. Application of the principle of equal treatment with regard to working
conditions, including the conditions governing dismissal, means that men
and women shall be guaranteed the same conditions without discrimina-
tion on grounds of sex.
2. To this end, Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure
that:
(a) any laws, regulations and administrative provisions contrary to the
principle of equal treatment shall be abolished;
(b) any provisions contrary to the principle of equal treatment which
are included in collective agreements, individual contracts of employ-
ment, internal rules of undertakings or in rules governing the inde-
pendent occupations and professions shall be, or may be declared, null
and void or may be amended;
(c) those laws, regulations and administrative provisions contrary to
the principle of equal treatment when the concern for protection which
originally inspired them is no longer well founded shall be revised; and
that where similar provisions are included in collective agreements la-
bour and management shall be requested to undertake the desired
revision.
Id.
15 See Council Directive 76/207, art. 6, 1976 O.J. (L 39/40). Article 6 provides
that:
Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems such
THE EFFECT OF KALANVKE DECISION
ures to obtain gender equality beyond those articulated" in the
Equal Treatment Directive."6
Although the principle of "equal pay for equal work" was es-
tablished almost twenty years ago, it appears that Member
States are still far from achieving the Community's goal of
equality among the sexes in the workplace. Typically, European
working women are not treated the same as their male counter-
parts:
the rate of unemployment amongst women is higher than
amongst men in most parts of the Community. Women still ac-
count for the majority of the long-term unemployed, they often
have low-skilled, poorly paid and insecure jobs and there are
still gaps in pay between men and women. There are also still
not enough women to whom decision-making posts and a full
share in political and economic life are open.17
The statistics regarding women in the workplace are not
very promising; for example, "in the European Union today, a
woman employed in the manual labor sector of the manufactur-
measures as are necessary to enable all persons who consider themselves
wronged by failure to apply to them the principle of equal treatment within
the meaning of Articles 3, 4, and 5 to pursue their claims by judicial proc-
ess after possible recourse to other competent authorities.
Id. Member-States may be sued under the ETD when acting as an employer. See
Ziccolella, supra note 105, at 646; Case 152184, Marshall v. Southampton and S.W.
Hampshire Area Health Auth., E.C.R. 723, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 688 (1986) (finding
that employer's policy requiring compulsory retirement of females at age 60 while
males could continue working until age 65 amounts to "dismissal" within meaning of
Article 5(1) and violates Equal Treatment Directive). The most widely relied upon
part of the ETD for victims of gender discrimination is article 5. Ziccolella, supra
note 105, at 659.
116 Id.; see also Council Directive 76/207, art. 2, 1976 O.J. (L 39/41) 4. Article 2
states in pertinent part that:
4. This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal
opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing ine-
qualities which affect womens' opportunities in the areas referred to in
Article 1 (1).
Id.
117 Communication on the Kalanke Ruling, EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., June 1996.
In the European Union today "[w/omen's work is segregated, with the majority of
women being concentrated in a few, low-paying professions." See Aharonian, supra
note 42, at 92. Additionally, more women "work in temporary or part-time jobs
which hold little or no promise for advancement." Id. Finally, women are
"disproportionately represented on the employment rolls-throughout Europe, the
unemployment rate for women averages 3 percent more than that for men." Society
for Human Resources Management, Issues Management Program, (visited Aug. 28,
1997) <http://www.shrm.org/issues/196aa.html> [hereinafter SHRM Issues Man-
agement Program].
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ing industry still earns[] an average of 25% less per hour than
her male counterparts.""8 Further, "[alithough statistics vary
among the ... Member States, the salaries of women range from
60% to 85% of that of men, and the gap widens proportionally
with age."" 9
B. Judicial Interpretation of Community Law Regarding
Women
1. Fundamental Right
The ECJ recognizes that the principle established by Article
119--"equal pay for equal work"-constitutes a fundamental
right.2 ' In Defrenne v. SABENA, 2' the Court determined that
"the elimination of discrimination based on sex" is a fundamen-
tal right based on general principles of Community law "the ob-
servance of which [the Court] has a duty to ensure."22
In Defrenne, the ECJ determined that "Article 119 was in
part directly effective, thereby allowing a woman to claim her
right to equal pay directly in any national court" and that "equal
pay was enforceable against both private and public employ-
ees." "t In this decision, the ECJ also expressed its frustration
with the failure of Member States to implement directives cre-
ated to ensure that discriminatory laws were in place within the
Member States' borders. 14
2. Limits on the Equal Treatment Directive
The concept of equal treatment for men and women is not
"8 Aharonian, supra note 42, at 91. This statistic holds true in other industries
as well. Id.
19 Id. According to a study from the International Labor Organization [ILO],
"the pay differential between men and women in Europe ranges from 20 percent to
50 percent depending on the job category and location." SHRM Issues Management
Program, supra note 117. The survey notes that in France "women receive an aver-
age of 30 percent less for performing the same work as men." Id.
120 Communication on the Kalanke Ruling, supra note 117.
121 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aerienne
(SABENA), Case 149/77, [19781 3 C.M.L.R. 312 (holding that national airline that
forced female stewardesses to retire at younger age than male counterparts did not
violate principles of community law prohibiting sex discrimination).
112 Id. at 329.
123 Aharonian, supra note 42, at 99.
124 See id. at 101. "Indeed, in Defrenne II, the ECJ noted that the absence of in-
fringement actiois against Member States by the Commission was likely to rein-
force the impression that Article 119 was in fact a limited provision." Id. at 101-02.
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without limits. For example, Member States are allowed to
derogate "from equal treatment in situations where specific du-
ties, not merely general activities, create a justified exception to
necessitate different treatment of men and women."" The legis-
lative ability to foster equal treatment of the sexes has also been
curtailed by the recent ECJ decision in Kalanke v. Freie Hans-
estadt Bremen.26
a) Background and Proceedings Below
On October 17, 1995, the ECJ determined that laws giving
automatic preference to women with the same qualifications as
men, and who are applying for identical positions in employment
areas where women are under-represented, violate Community
law. In Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Kalanke, a male
horticulturist from Bremen, Germany, applied for a promotion in
the Parks Department where he was employed since 1973.27
Heike Glil3man, a female landscaper, who worked in the Parks
Department since 1975, also applied for the position.' The two
candidates had similar credentials'29 and both were "shortlisted"
during the final stage of recruitment.
The management of the Parks Department recommended
that Kalanke be promoted, but the reviewing staff committee re-
fused to give its consent. 3 ' The issue was sent to an arbitration
committee which also recommended Kalanke for the position. 3'
Instead of hiring Kalanke, however, the staff committee declared
the arbitration process a failure and appealed to the Conciliation
Board for a binding decision. Finding the candidates to be
equally qualified, the Conciliation Board determined that prior-
ity should, therefore, be given to Ms. GliBman in accordance with
the Bremen Act on Equal Treatment for Men and Women in the
125 Noel, supra note 107, at 85-86. The courts, however, strictly construe the
power to derogate. Id.; see also JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAW 263 (3d
ed. 1992).
126 [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 175.
127 Id. at 179.
128 Id.
"9 Kalanke had a diploma in landscape gardening and horticulture and had
worked as permanent assistant to the Section Manager in the Parks Department.
Id. at 191. GliIlman had a diploma in landscape gardening and was employed as a
horticultural employee. Id.
13 Id. at 179.
131 Id.
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Public Services ("Bremen Act").132
The Bremen Act provides that in the case of appointment,
assignment, or promotion to an official post or position, "women
who have the same qualifications as men applying for the same
post are to be given priority in sectors where they are under-
represented."13 Under-representation is deemed to exist when
"women do not make up at least half of the staff in the individual
pay, remuneration and salary brackets in the relevant personnel
group within a department.
" 134
Mr. Kalanke brought his case before the Bremen Labour
Court arguing, inter alia, that the Bremen Act was incompatible
with German constitutional law.13 His application was dis-
missed and he appealed to the Regional Labour Court. After
again being denied relief, Mr. Kalanke appealed to the Bunde-
sarbeitsgericht, the German national court. The national court
not only re-examined the issues raised in the trial court, but also
found it appropriate to attempt to reconcile the Bremen Act with
the principle of equal treatment codified by Council Directive
76/207136 as well as various Community provisions.'
Regarding national law, the Bundesarbeitsgericht found the
132 Id. at 193.
1'3 The Bremen Act on equal treatment for men and women, the Landesgleich-
stellungsgesetz of November 20, 1990 provides, in part, that:
(1) In the case of an appointment (including establishment as a civil ser-
vant or judge) which is not made for training purposes, women who have
the same qualifications as men applying for the same post are to be given
priority in sectors where they are under-represented.
(2) In the case of an assignment to a position in a higher pay, remuneration
and salary bracket, women who have the same qualifications as men apply-
ing for the same post are to be given priority if they are under-represented.
This also applies in the case of assignment to a different official post and
promotion.
(3)...
(4) Qualifications are to be evaluated exclusively in accordance with the
requirements of the occupation, post to be filled or career bracket. Specific
experience and capabilities, such as those acquired as a result of family
work, social commitment or unpaid activity, are part of the qualifications
within the meaning of subparagraphs (1) and (2) if they are of use in per-
forming the duties of the position in question.
Id. at 191.
134 Id. (quoting from paragraph five of Bremen Act).
"5 Id. at 192. Kalanke argued that the Bremen Act quota system violated the
Bremen Constitution, German Basic Law (Grudgesetz) and the German Civil Code.
Id. 136 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40.
137 Id. at 180.
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Bremen Act to be compatible with the German Constitution and
statutory law. The court, however, was unsure whether the
"positive discrimination" law violated Community law.138 Al-
though the national court determined that there were a number
of factors suggesting that the Bremen Act did not clash with
Council Directive 76/207, the court nevertheless stayed the pro-
ceedings and sought a preliminary ruling from the ECJ on the
issue of whether the Bremen Act violated Council Directive
76/207.39
b) Proceedings Before the European Court of Justice
Council Directive 76/207 requires Member States to adhere
to the principle of equal treatment for men and women regarding
access to employment as well as promotion." Discrimination on
the basis of sex shall be impermissible either directly or indi-
rectly."' Measures designed to promote equal employment op-
portunity for men and women, especially those created to remove
"existing inequalities which affect women's opportunities," are
lawful under the directive.
42
In support of the Bremen Act, the German court noted that
the quota system at issue may, in fact, contribute to the elimi-
nation of current disadvantages which women face as it will in-
crease the presence of women in senior employment posts. 4 3 The
Bundesarbeitsgericht noted that the reality among city employ-
ees in Bremen is that there exists only a small proportion of
women in the upper echelon of positions and salaries in numer-
ous careers. 44 Moreover, the German court stated that the con-
centration of women in lower career brackets is "contrary to the
13 Id.
," Id. at 192. The European Court of Justice determined that the national court
was essentially asking whether "the Directive precludes national rules such as those
in the present case, where candidates of different sexes shortlisted for promotion
are equally qualified, automatically give priority to women in sectors where they are
under-represented ...."Id. at 193.
140 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40.
.41 See Kalanke, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at 193.
14 Id. (quoting Article 2(4) of the directive). The Court noted that the directive
was created to allow for measures "which, although discriminatory in appearance,
are in fact intended to eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality which may
exist in the reality of social life." Id. at 193-94 (citations omitted).
"' See id.
1" See id. The German court also noted that careers in which the presence of
women is established, such as education, are excluded from preferential hiring
practices. See id. at 193-94.
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equal rights criteria applicable today."4 5
The European Court of Justice found that national rules
giving women automatic priority over equally qualified men in
sectors where women are under-represented involve unwelcome
sex discrimination. "6 The Court noted that although Directive
76/207 does allow for measures "which give a specific advantage
to women with a view to improving their ability to compete on
the labour market and to pursue a career on an equal footing
with men,"4 7 it prohibits rules that give women automatic and
absolute priority, and "go beyond promoting equal opportunities
and overstep the limits" of the directive.!8
Advocates for the Bremen Act argued that it did not provide
women automatic priority; rather, they argued that the law
stated that women would receive preference only in those sectors
of employment where they were under-represented and only af-
ter they satisfied certain qualifications. "9 The ECJ disagreed
with this line of reasoning, -however, and held that the Bremen
Act did, in fact, give women absolute and automatic priority, and
therefore, was precluded by directive 76/207. This decision,
which ultimately determined that certain types of positive dis-
crimination are violative of Community law, is simply a limita-
tion on the Equal Treatment Directive.
Although the Community has not legislated an official defi-
nition of "positive action,"' the Commission has embraced an
expansive view of what this phrase means. In 1984, the Com-
mission proposed "a recommendation on the promotion of posi-
tive action," which the Council ultimately adopted. 5' Under the
14 Id. at 193.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 194.
148 id.
149 The national court noted that "the case does not involve a system of strict
quotas reserving a certain proportion of posts for women, regardless of their qualifi-
cations, but rather a system of quotas dependent on candidates' abilities. Women
enjoy no priority unless the candidates of both sexes are equally qualified." Id. at
192.
110 See Communication on the Kalanke Ruling, supra note 117. Some in the
Community espouse the view that "the concept of positive action embraces all
measures which aim to counter the effects of past discrimination, to eliminate exist-
ing discrimination and to promote equality of opportunity between women and men,
particularly in relation to types or levels of jobs where members of one sex are sig-
nificantly under-represented." Id. This idea appears to be consistent with the view
of the European Commission and Council.
151 Id.
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Commission's recommendation, Member States are encouraged
to enact positive action programs with the goal of eliminating
existing inequalities affecting women in the workplace and
"promot[ing] a better balance between the sexes in employment
... or seeking employment which arise from existing attitudes,
behaviolr and structures based on the idea of a traditional divi-
sion of roles in society between men and women."152
Presumably, the Kalanke decision did not declare all positive
action programs to be violative of Community law. The broadest
reading of Kalanke would merely eliminate sex quota programs
in all facets of employment. Member States, however, are still
allowed to use other types of programs designed to accomplish
the goals maintained by the Equal Treatment and Equal Value
Directives.
III. SUPREMACY OF COMMUNITY LAW
An autonomous legal system has emerged from the devel-
opment of the EU, imposing rights and obligations on individuals
and Member States."3 According to the ECJ, membership in the
EU "entails limitation of the Member States' sovereign rights no
longer in 'limited' but in 'ever wider' fields."54
The EEC Treaty does not specify what happens in a situa-
tion in which Community law conflicts with the laws of the
Member States."5 The ECJ has determined that since member-
ship in the Community entails a partial transfer of sovereign
powers, it is only logical that Community legislation supersede
112 Id.
' See NUGENT, supra note 45, at 176-77. This system has been created through
the use of three concepts: direct effect, primacy and direct applicability. Id. at 177-
78. For discussion of direct effect, see supra notes 1143-53 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 152-78 and accompanying text for explanation of primacy. A law is
directly applicable if national measures do not have to be enacted for the law to be
binding within the member states. See NUGENT, supra note 45, at 177. Regulations
are always directly applicable and according to several ECJ judgments, other legal
acts which meet certain criteria may be directly applicable as well. Id. at 177-78.
164 Barav, supra note 5, at 270 (citing Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Neder-
landse Administratie Der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 12 (1963) ("limited") and
Opinion 1/91, [1991] E.C.R. 1-6102, consid. 21 (1991) ("ever wider")). In Van Gend en
Loos, the ECJ determined that "the establishment of the EEC Treaty created a new
legal order." Ziccolella, supra note 105, at 652. As member states joined the Com-
munity, they gave up part of their national sovereignty. See NUGENT, supra note 45,
at 177.155 See SHARPSTON, supra note 40, at 6.
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national legislation.156 In a landmark decision, Costa v. ENEL,'57
"the doctrine of the supremacy, or primacy, of Community law"
was developed. 58 The ECJ held, in part, that the law stemming
from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, be-
cause of its special and original nature, be overridden by domes-
tic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of
its character as Community law and without the legal basis of
the Community itself being called into question.
The transfer by the Member States from their domestic legal
system to the Community legal system of the "rights and obliga-
tions arising from the Treaty, carries with it a clear limitation of
their sovereign right upon which a subsequent unilateral law,
incompatible with the aims of the Community, cannot prevail." 9
The Court's decision in Costa established that Community
law was the supreme law of the land, creating rights which in-
dividuals could rely upon even if national law dictated other-
wise. '6 As a result of the Costa decision, national courts must
apply EU law in the event of a conflict between EU law and na-
tional law, even if the national law is part of the Member State's
constitution.' The doctrine of the supremacy of Community law
over national law is one which the ECJ "has upheld with the
greatest vigour." 6' For the most part, national courts have ac-
cepted this doctrine although some doubts have been raised."
For example, German attorneys have expressed concern as
to whether Community law trumps the provisions of the German
Constitution (Grundgesetz), "especially those concerning funda-
"6 Ziccolella, supra note 105, at 652.
's7 Case 16/64, Costa, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. 425 (1964) ENEL [1964] C.M.L.R. 425.
158 SHARPSTON, supra note 40, at 6; see also Case 92/78, Simmenthal Sp. v.
Commission, 1979 E.C.R 777, [1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 25 (1980) (concluding that "every
national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its
entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accord-
ingly set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether
prior or subsequent to the Community rule").
59 Costa, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R. at 456.
"0 See Tamara L. Joseph, Preaching Heresy: Permitting Member States to En-
force Stricter Environmental Laws than the European Community, 20 YALE J. INTL
L. 227, 234 (1995).
'61 See NUGENT, supra note 45, at 176-78. This met with opposition until the
European Court announced it would "annul any provision of Community law con-
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mental human rights."" Since every law in Germany is deemed
to be subordinate to the Constitution, some members of the
German legal community believe that "Community law could not
apply in Germany if it violated the fundamental human rights
provisions of the Grundgesetz."'" Other members of the Euro-
pean Union agree with the German attorneys, arguing that the
constitutional rights of individual states may not be infringed
upon by the Community. In support of this contention, authori-
ties believe that "Community law owes its existence to a partial
transfer of sovereignty by the Member States to the Community
... [and that] a Member State cannot be regarded as having in-
cluded in that transfer the power to legislate contrary to rights
protected by its constitution .... ,,16' However, the ECJ has not ac-
cepted this argument.1
7
The Commission supervises the execution of ECJ deci-
sions." Member States are not allowed to review ECJ judgments
and are required to enforce the Court's decisions, even if the
application of national law would have led to a different result.'69
Generally, enforcement of ECJ decisions has not been problem-
atic; some situations have arisen, however, in which states have
not complied with the Court's rulings.7 '
'" Id.; see NUGENT, supra note 45, at 220 ("A few problems do still remain-
notably in relation to fundamental rights guaranteed by national constitutions-but
for the most part the authority and binding nature of Community law is fully estab-
lished.").
'G HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 140 n.17 (noting that "strong attachment of Ger-
man lawyers to the concept of fundamental law, and especially fundamental human
rights, is ... understandable in the light of recent German history").
Ic Id. at 143 n.17 (citing per Advocate General Warner, Case 7/76, IRCA, 1976
E.C.R. 1213, 1237).
"7 However, on controversial or complicated issues, the Court may develop a
hands off mentality. For example on the abortion issue, the Court has "accepted that
abortion clinics perform a service ... if their activities are legal in the Member State
where they are located." HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 145. States such as Ireland,
with a strong history of constitutional prohibition of abortion, would assuredly not
allow the imposition of the constitutional right to have an abortion of other states.
'r" HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 312 (5th ed. 1992) (citing ECSC TREATY art. 88, and EEC
TREATY art. 169 as controlling).
... Id. at 506. Only the ECJ may suspend a judgment. Id.
'70 Id. at 505 (For exceptions, see Case 48/71, Re Export Tax on Art Treasure
(No. 2): Commission v. Italy, [1972] C.M.L.R. 699 and Case 97/80, Second Mutton
and Lamb case, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 43). "It is well known that Member States do not
always comply with Treaty provisions or with directly applicable secondary Com-
munity legislation." Rolf Wdgenbaur, How to Improve Compliance with European
Community Legislation and the Judgments of the European Court of Justice, 19
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Member States are granted a "reasonable period" to execute
the decisions of the ECJ.171 If a State is slow to comply, however,
the Commission may exert pressure to "encourage" compliance.
172
The Court may also pressure a State by threatening to make a
second, more severe condemnation. Due to adverse decisions
against several Member States and other cases pending "for not
respecting judgments of the Court," the need to use this second
condemnation method has increased considerably.
173
It is assumed that national courts generally acquiesce and
apply the preliminary ruling issued by the ECJ. Although a na-
tional court's decision "to refer questions to the Court of Justice"
may imply "a willingness to give effect to the rulings,"74 volun-
tary compliance is by no means guaranteed. For example,
"[p]roblems may arise ... when the Court of Justice render[s] a
more extensive ruling than was requested."75
If a Member State fails to rectify a breach of Community
law, the ECJ is powerless to enforce specific measures required
to end the breach. 76 The Court is only empowered to find that
the Member State has failed to fulfill its obligations, and to sug-
gest measures that are needed to cure the breach. 7 Ultimately,
it is the individual Member State that must initiate the steps
needed to comply with the judgment of the Court. 71
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 936, 936 (1996).
17 SCHERMERS & WAELBROECK, supra note 168, at 505.
172 For example, during the 43 months that Italy took to comply with the Court
decision in First Art Treasures Case, "[t]he Commission exerted considerable pres-
sure on Italy to comply with the Court judgment .... " Id. at 312. In fact, the Com-
mission "opened a new procedure under Article 169, this time for breach of Article
171, which requires the State to take the necessary measures to comply with the
judgment rendered under Article 169." Id.
172 Id. at 312-13. But see L. NEVILLE BROWN, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 78 (3d ed. 1989) ("To date, almost every judgment against
a Member State has been complied with, although in a few instances only after con-
siderable delay.").
174 SCHERMERS & WAELBROECK, supra note 168, at 440.
'7" Id. at 440; see Barav, supra note 5, at 272 (noting Court's "proclivity to re-
draft the questions put to it").
176 See BROWN, supra note 173, at 234 (noting that ECJ has no power to enforce
judgments).
Id. at 234-35 (stating that "[the ECJ] has no criminal jurisdiction whatso-
ever, nor does it have the power to commit for contempt .... ").
178 See SCHERMERS & WAELBROECK, supra note 168, at 312. If a directive has
not been implemented within the required time period, an individual may, under
certain circumstances, use the directive against the state government. Ziccolella,
supra note 105, at 654. "[Tihe effectiveness of Community law is almost entirely de-
pendent on the quality of the legal solutions adopted in the national context."
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The ECJ and the Community as a whole have continued to
face problems enforcing ECJ directives."' It seems that the
unique nature of the directive system has created the enforce-
ment and compliance problem because directives only establish
broad objectives and have no direct legislative impact. As a re-
sult, Member States must enact legislation individually to
achieve those objectives. 8" In fact, "an unwilling Member State
can avoid its Community legal obligations by adopting legislation
and procedures which comply only in form, but not in substance,
with the objectives of a given Community Directive."' Although
theoretically Member States must "construe domestic legislation
in any field covered by a Community Directive so as to accord
with the interpretation of the Directive as laid down" by the
ECJ,"8' in practice, directives have been implemented poorly."
Curtin & Mortelmans, supra note 102, at 437.
179 See James D. Pagliaro & Brady L. Green, E.C. Directive Proposal is Based on
CERCLA, NATL L.J., Feb. 10, 1992, at 27. Although "'[tihere is a perception that the
'Southern European' countries are less diligent at both implementation and en-
forcement of E.C. legislation' .... The problem is not limited ... to southern coun-
tries." Thomas R. Mounteer, Proposed European Community Directive for Damage
to the Environment Caused by Waste, 23 ENVTL. L. 107, 136 (1993) (quoting TREVOR
ADAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
32, in PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY (Apr. 18, 1991) (unpublished course material, available from the ABA
section of Natural Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law)); see also NUGENT,
supra note 45, at 373 (noting that "national courts have occasionally sought to as-
sert national rights and interests against the Community").
'' Pagliaro & Green, supra note 179, at 27.
181 See Aharonian, supra note 42, at 112-13 (noting that "[w]hether purposefully,
for lack of strong commitment, or because of genuine difficulties encountered in the
process of implementation, Member States have not carried out the objectives of the
Equal Value Directive eradicating-wage discrimination").
18 Leslie Braginsky, Comment, How Changes in Employer Identity Affect Em-
ployment Continuity: A Comparison of the United States and the United Kingdom,
16 COmP. LAB. L.J. 231, 254 (1995) (citing Webb v. Emo Air Cargo Ltd., 1993 I.C.R.
175, 186D (Eng.)).
13 See Mounteer, supra note 179, at 135 (noting that directives pertaining to
environmental matters have been most poorly implemented because member states
are delinquent in adopting own legislation). In fact, the Commission has noted that
"the present situation is 'far from satisfactory' and that 'only a sustained effort over
a number of years will bring about a marked improvement .... '" Id. at 136 (quoting
Commission of the European Community, Eighth Annual Report to the European
Parliament on Commission Monitoring of the Application of Community Law, 1991
O.J. (C338) at 205,221). But see Wdgenbaur, supra note 170, at 937 ("Delayed im-
plementation of a directive or implementation that does not always comply with the
content or spirit of the directive can at times be blamed on Community institutions.
If Community texts were simpler and clearer, Member States would have less diffi-
culties implementing them or would be likely to make fewer errors of interpretation
1997]
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Not only have Member States failed to implement directives
within the stipulated time period, but they have also failed to
enact provisions that "comply with the text or the spirit of thedirective. " "
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE SYSTEM
The main purpose behind the establishment of the EU was
to bring about a common market."" The Member States, how-
ever, "differ widely in their histories, customs and social and cul-
tural values."8 ' Therefore, in creating the Community, it was
never expected or desired that uniformity would be established
in all these matters. 7 In fact, "national laws and customs which
did not constitute obstacles to the establishment of such a mar-
ket" were not intended to be interfered with.' Many aspects of
Community law, however, may be construed in a more expansive
or stricter manner than originally intended.8 9 As the English
High Court has stated "[a]ccording to the way [the Community
laws] are interpreted, they may have more or less of an impact
on questions of social policy which in member-States are strongly
felt to be matters for national decision." 90
The ability of the ECJ to alter the social policy of Member
States depends on numerous factors including, inter alia, its law-
making ability, compliance by Member States, and its enforce-
ment powers. These factors are crucial in determining whether
a decision of the Court will have any real effect on members of
the Community. If the national courts do not apply Community
law, or if there are no mechanisms within the Member countries
to implement the rulings, Community law will remain an ab-
stract legal theory and not a concrete part of citizens' lives. 9'
of Community texts.")
"' Wagenbaur, supra note 170, at 937. This is a result of member states being
responsible for adapting their existing legislation or establishing new legislation to
conform to the directives. Id.
5 See EEC TREATY art. 2 ("The Community shall have as its task, by establish-
ing a common market ... to promote ... a harmonious development of economic ac-
tivities .... "); Stoke-on-Trent City Council v. B & Q, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 897,34.





191 See Curtin & Mortelmans, supra note 102, at 423.
Application and enforcement of Community law must be considered as the
"low-politics" flip-side of the institutional coin. In the application and en-
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A. Law Making Capacity
A limitation on the power of the ECJ is that the Court itself
cannot initiate actions, but instead must wait to receive cases
which have been referred to it. 9' Moreover, once cases have been
referred, the ECJ is not overly anxious to usurp national inter-
ests. 93 In addition, when the Court does challenge such policies,
it moves with caution. 94 One way the Court can "sweeten the
pill" is to introduce a new doctrine gradually. 95 For example, the
Court could establish the doctrine as a general principle, subject
to various qualifications and perhaps suggest reasons why it
should not apply to the case at hand.'96 Once the Court has spo-
ken on the matter, however, the principle becomes established,
and as long as "there are not too many protests, it will be re-
affirmed in later cases."'97 However, countries that disagree with
the ECJ directives may appeal its rulings or enact new statutes
to protect their national laws.'98
It is debatable whether the Court creates new law when
rendering preliminary rulings since the courts of the Member
States disagree as to whether the rulings are binding in other
factually similar cases. It seems as if "[blinding force will only
be attributed to [preliminary rulings] if the national courts see
fit to do so."'
forcement of Community law, market operators and public authorities
have concrete, real-life contacts. National authorities enforce regulations
on working hours on (Clapham) buses or they deliver plaice quotas to
Basque fishermen. Employers apply the equal treatment principle or an
environmental directive.
Id.
92 See NUGENT, supra note 45, at 222.
1 3 See SCHERMERS & WAELBROECK, supra note 168, at 440 (citations omitted).
The ECJ often leaves delicate matters to be determined by national courts. Id. This
can put national courts in a difficult position, having to choose between encroaching
on the province of another branch of the State and ignoring Court rulings. "In its
interpretation of the Treaty, the European Court has tried to tread a careful line
which permits both boldness in advancing the [objectives] of the Community and
sensitivity to the domestic interests of member-States." Stoke-on-Trent, [1990] 3
C.M.L.R. 897,35. National courts are sensitive to domestic separation of powers and
despite a Court ruling, will not trespass in areas which are reserved for other
branches of government. See id.
' HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 87.
"' Id. at 87-89.
1o Id. at 88.
197 Id.
"' See O'Dwyer, supra note 87, at 1.
"' SCHERMERS & WAELBROECK, supra note 168, at 440; see also European Un-
ion Court Ruling Limits Job Preference for Women, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1995, at 11
1997]
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B. Compliance
1. Bringing Actions
The role of the ECJ has been compared to that of the U.S.
Supreme Court in the early years of its development in America.
As one author noted, "[b]oth are constitutional courts charged
with the preservation and the development of the law in a new
society." °° However, it seems that the disparity between the
"legal" power of the ECJ and its actual effectiveness is greater
than some organizations and members of the Community would
like to admit.
a) Determining whether a reference is required
Some observers of the ECJ argue that a gap in legal protec-
tion "exists when a national court does not share a party's con-
viction that a preliminary reference on a question of Community
law is necessary to reach a decision.""' The ECJ is careful to
avoid interfering with the process through which national courts
decide which matters to refer.12  Instead, these decisions are
"left entirely to the discretion of the national judge."203 A nation's
failure to observe the duty to refer undermines the Community's
interest in compliance of Community law, 2  and infringes upon
individual legal protections created by Community law.205 How-
ever, if the reference has been omitted deliberately, the only le-
gal sanction available is to set aside the decision.2 6
b) Acte Clair
Article 177 of the EC Treaty states that a national court
(asserting that ECJ's rulings are not necessarily binding over national and local
laws).
'0o SCHERMERS & WAELBROECK, supra note 168, at 1; see also Fred Barbash,
Little-Known Court Voids Laws of Europe's Nations, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1995, at
A25 (noting that ECJ authority over EU members has been compared to U.S. Su-
preme Court's authority over United States of America).
20 Lenz, supra note 54, at 394; see JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAW
304 (3d ed. 1993) (noting that no matter how important issue may be to individual,
litigant cannot compel national court to refer).
202 See STEINER, supra note 201, at 288.
202 Id. (noting that separation of powers is simultaneously strength and weak-
ness of Article 177).
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from which there is no appeal, "shall" bring a reference in cases
where the outcome is dependent upon the interpretation of a
provision of Community law." 7 Despite this seemingly manda-
tory language, the Court has developed the somewhat contradic-
tory doctrine of "acte clair." The word "shall" has not been inter-
preted by the Court as obliging a Member State always to refer a
Community law question; rather, the concept of "acte clair" ap-
plies "if the answer to the question under Community law is so
completely clear and obvious that it would merely be a waste of
time and money to make a reference, even a 'final court' need not
refer.
,208
The effect of this doctrine "may be unfortunate, both for the
individual and for the uniform application of Community law."
20 9
If a final court refuses to make a reference to the ECJ because it
determines that an issue is "acte clair," the individual is de-
prived of Community law rights. Since individuals are not al-
lowed to bring references before the ECJ, the litigant is therefore
denied a remedy. While the Commission may later issue a com-
munication indicating that the ruling of the national court de-
prived the litigant of procedural protection guaranteed under
Community law, it is of little comfort to the aggrieved individual
denied justice. 10
2. Remedies
Theoretically, Member States should all apply Community
law in a uniform manner, however, it is possible that this will
not always be the case.21' Judgments of the national courts
"7 EC TREATY art. 177.203 SHARPSTON, supra note 40, at 17. In C.LL.F.I.T. v. Minister of Health, the
ECJ determined that a national court must bring a reference unless the question
raised is irrelevant or that the Community provision in question has already been
interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of Community law is so ob-
vious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. The existence of such a possibil-
ity must be assessed in light of the specific characteristics of Community law, the
particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of diver-
gences in judicial decisions within the Community. [19831 1 C.M.L.R. 472, 491
(1983). Before resolving the case, the national court must also be convinced that the
matter is obvious to the courts of the member states and the ECJ.
20 SHARPSTON, supra note 40, at 19-20; see STEINER, supra note 201, at 297
(noting that "[w]here a disappointed party does not have the means or the stamina
to a Ieal it may result in a misapplication of EEC law").SHARPSTON, supra note 40, at 21.
2 1 Lenz, supra note 54, at 390-91. This is why the founders of the Community
afforded the Court of Justice exclusive power to interpret questions of Community
1997]
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which incorrectly apply Community law "are irrevocable and ac-
cepted with disapproval by the legal system."212  Because
"Member States are primarily responsible for the application of
Community law,"213 the goal of creating a powerful central court
in the European legal system is potentially threatened. Member
States are empowered to determine what kind of remedy an in-
dividual should receive. 214 However, they must at least "ensure
that there is an effective remedy for the enforcement of Commu-
nity rights."15 If a situation arises in which there may be doubt
as to the effectiveness or appropriateness of a remedy, the ECJ
may, on rare occasion, take action. 6
These characteristics reveal both the strengths and weak-
nesses of the Court. It is able to initiate changes which can alter
the law of the individual Member States, but, can only go as far
as the states will allow. Therefore, if a policy is too firmly rooted
in national identity, or if a policy is simply too political, the pro-
tests will be loud and the Court's decision-making capabilities
will be stymied.
V. COMMUNITY REACTION TO THE KALANKE DECISION
The European Court of Justice's ruling in the Kalanke deci-
sion theoretically affects the twenty-two European states in its
jurisdiction.27 At a minimum, these states are barred from using
affirmative action quota programs which give women an absolute
right to a position when competing with equally qualified men in
law. Id.
212 Id. at 397. Such inability to escape incorrect applications of law raises the
question of whether other tiers of review should be established. Id. Such interfer-
ence is troubling, however, because it represents "a fundamental interference in the
Member States' legal system." Id.
21 Id. at 390.
214 Ziccolella, supra note 105, at 665-66. This principle was established by the
ECJ in Van Colson and Kamann v. Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, 1984 E.C.R.
1981, 1910-11, [19861 2 C.M.L.R. 430, 454-55.
211 HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 231. Member states "often drag their feet in
complying with court decisions." Barbash, supra note 200 (noting Court of Justice is
alternative avenue of redress for plaintiffs).216 For example, in Marshall II, the ECJ ruled that "there can be no a priori
limit to the amount of damages recoverable" in a case in which the claim was cre-
ated by Community law but national law set a limit on the remedy allowed.
HARTLEY, supra note 13, at 233.
217 But see O'Dwyer, supra note 87 (explaining that while Norway's membership
in the European Economic Area ("EEA") gives ECJ jurisdiction, Norway contends
that Kalanke should only apply to fifteen EU Member States).
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a field where women are under-represented.218 In fact, the deci-
sion has raised concerns that other affirmative-action programs,
particularly in the Scandinavian countries, would be abandoned
in compliance with the ECJ directive.21 9 By examining the actual
impact of the decision on certain groups affected by the ECJ
ruling, it is clear that the effect of ECJ rulings is anything but
certain. Some groups will be able to reject the Kalanke ruling, or
at least justify a reason for not following it. 2 0 This does not
mean, however, that the court is powerless to cause any lasting
changes in the law of the Member States; its rulings certainly
will be complied with by some national courts.
The court's decision in Kalanke can legitimately be inter-
preted in two ways: "either the Court dismissed the possibility of
justifying any quota system, even one containing a safeguard
clause which allows the particular circumstances of a case to be
taken into account, or the Court restricted itself to the 'rigid'
quotas provided for in the Bremen law and applied to Mr.
Kalanke, that is in an automatic manner."
221
A. The European Commission
The reaction within the Commission to the Kalanke ruling
has not been one of overwhelming support. Padraig Flynn, the
European Commissioner with responsibility for Employment and
Social Affairs, has expressed concern that the judgment is con-
trary to his belief that the Equal Treatment Directive allowed
Member States to choose between a wide variety of actions to
achieve equality in the workplace.2 Prior to Kalanke, the
Commissioner was not aware that any specific model used to
achieve equality among the sexes in the job arena would violate
Community law.' While acknowledging disappointment with
the ruling, Flynn was also careful to point out that the ECJ has
218 See id.
219 Coleman et al., supra note 4, at 1. See Commission to Amend Affirmative Ac-
tion Legislation, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Nov. 23, 1995, available in 1995 WL 11475122
(noting EU Commissioner Padraig Flynn's plans to amend legislation to remove any
ambiguity).
"' See Bonn Queries EU Court Powers to Rule on Quotas, ANP ENG. NEWS
BULL., Oct. 26, 1995 (noting that Germany is investigating whether ECJ had power
to make Kalanke ruling or if ruling infringed on "principle of subsidiarity").
221 Communication on the Kalanke Ruling, supra note 117.
22 Flynn Remarks to Equal Protection Women's Committee on Court Judgment,
Press Release, RAPID, Oct. 18, 1995.
223 Id.
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been responsible in the past for progressive decisions regarding
equal opportunity.224
The Commission's response has been two-fold: it has at-
tempted to minimize the import of the court's ruling, and it has
proposed changes in Community law to reflect a more permissive
rule of law. The official position of the Commission has been to
interpret Kalanke as narrowly as possible. "The Commission
considers that the Court has only condemned the automatic
quota system of the Land of Bremen.""' It has focused on the
language of the Court regarding the "'absolute and uncondi-
tional' nature of the preference" given to the Bremen women. 8
In fact, the Commission "takes the view that quota systems
which fall short of the degree of rigidity and automacity provided
for by the Bremen law have not been touched by the Court's
judgment" and are still lawful.227
Despite the narrow interpretation of Kalanke, the Commis-
sion believes that Article 2(4) of the directive should be rewritten
to permit positive action measures that are unaffected by the
judgment.2 In March of 1996, Padraig Flynn "persuaded the
Commission to issue a communication clarifying the ruling and
amending the 1976 directive on the equal treatment of women
224 Id. The Commissioner concluded an address to the European Parliament's
Women's Committee that "[w]e should not add to the venom which is sometimes di-
rected against the Court just because we have been disappointed once. The cause of
women is well served by having a Community of law, and tomorrow there may be
another positive judgment for women." Id. Flynn has publicly reacted to the decision
with the hope of defusing "the growing animosity of representatives of women," who
still feel threatened by the decision despite political support in their favor. Commis-
sion Defines Scope of Positive Discrimination in Favour of Women, EUR. Soc. POLY,
Apr. 12, 1996.
22' Communication on Kalanke Ruling, supra note 117.
226 Id. The Commission acknowledged that "the Court refers to the problem of
'substituting for equality of opportunity ... the result which is only to be arrived at
by providing such equality of opportunity.'" Id. It noted however, that this reference
was only added as a rider to the main idea of the Court being the absolute nature of
the preference. Id. It appears as if the Commission regards some parts of the
Court's rulings as more influential than others.
227 Id. However, not all members of the European government are critical of the
decision. For example, Mrs. Kjier-Hansen, a member of the European Parliament,
asserts that Kalanke is "[a] victory for equal opportunities." Nevertheless, Kjier's
view is in the minority of most women in the Parliament, who see the Kalanke deci-
sion as a "sharp setback." Discrimination of Women Continues (on file with author).
228 Positive Action Measures on Equal Opportunities "Still Possible," EUR.
INDUS. REL. REV., May, 1996.
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and men." 9 The directive was to be amended so that Member
States could enact non-mandatory quotas or other measures
aimed at decreasing the imbalance of the genders in the work-
place. The communication was also issued with the hope of pro-
tecting existing laws in the Nordic countries and Germany."
The Commission's position is that "systematic discrimination in
favour of women is not allowable." Rather, it supports "systems
that provide for flexibility in individual cases."2' The European
Commission has recommended to the Council that Article 2, sec-
tion 4 of the Equal Treatment Directive be modified to reflect a
position of flexibility."
Narrow construction by the Commission, however, does not
necessarily mean narrow construction by the court. Moreover, it
is quite possible that the measure will not gain the unanimous
vote needed for enactment because states such as England pub-
licly oppose quotas. The Commission has stated that a proper
construction of the limited ruling permits a broad spectrum of
measures to reduce discrimination in the workplace. It is un-
clear, however, exactly whose interpretation of the ruling is the
"correct" one. Moreover, although the Commission has expressed
its desire that "the controversy to which the Kalanke case has
22 Patrick Smyth, EU to Amend its Equality Directive, THE IRISH TIMES, Mar.
28, 1996.
2" See id. Cabinet member Kare Banks has indicated that she feels confident
the amendment will be unanimously accepted since it is "permissive rather than
prescriptive." Id.
2' See Commission Defines Scope of Positive Discrimination in Favour of
Women, supra note 224. The Commission found that a permissible program for the
advancement of women would indicate "the proportion of women expected to rise to
a particular rank within a certain timeframe ... as long as the individual decisions
involved take account of particular circumstances." Id.
23 The Commission has proposed that Article 2 of the Directive be replaced as
follows:
This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal op-
portunity for men and women in particular by removing existing inequali-
ties which affect the opportunities of the under-represented sex .... Possi-
ble measures shall include the giving of preference, as regards access to
employment or promotion, to a member of the under-represented sex, pro-
vided that such measures do not preclude the assessment of the particular
circumstances of an individual case.
Equal Treatment Between Men and Women: European Commission Clarifies the
Kalanke Ruling, Press Release, RAPID, Mar. 27, 1996. The Commission wants to
make it clear that "positive action measures short of rigid quotas are permitted by
Community law." Id. Finally, an amendment would "ensure that the text of the Di-
rective reflects more clearly the true legal position which results from the judgment
of the Court." Id.
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given rise should be ended definitively," it is questionable
whether the opinion of the Commission ultimately will affect the
Court's interpretation of the law."
B. Germany
Following the ECJ decision in Kalanke, Mr. Kalanke re-
quested the city of Bremen to re-examine his original application
for the landscaping post currently held by Ms. GliBman.' The
Bremen court denied the request and Mr. Kalanke subsequently
notified the Commission with the hope of reversing the decision
of the city administration.235 The Commission has not yet issued
a statement.26
Officials in Bremen who expressed satisfaction in the fact
that Ms. GliJ3man has remained in her post, have nonetheless
denounced the ECJ's decision in Kalanke and the overall re-
sponse of the Community institutions. For example, Christine
Wishcher, Bremen's Senator for Women, "expressed 'shock'" at
the Court's ruling and has predicted that it will "worsen 'the al-
ready poor acceptance of the European Union' among the citizens
of Germany."237 Likewise, Urlike Hauffe, the head of Bremen's
Equal Opportunities Board, believes that employment quotas are
valuable instruments in preventing sex discrimination and has
stated that the Kalanke ruling was "regrettable." 8 Ms. Hauffe
has also asserted that the "principle of quotas under the German
law would not be amended and that the Federal LaboUr Court ...
'has no intention' of acting in a way that runs counter to other
provisions prescribing quotas for women." 9 Additionally, Hauffe
has criticized the draft amendment of the 1976 Directive, argu-
ing that the proposal would not improve the condition of Euro-
233 Id. Indeed, "a deep split has opened up on this subject between most of the
[social affairs] Council Ministers and the European Commission." See Social Affairs
Council: Broad Agreement on Burden of Proof Directive, EUR. REP., Dec. 4, 1996.
24 Social Policy: Experts Call for EU Treaty to Address Equal Opportunities,
EUR. REP., May 7, 1996.
235 Id.
26 Id. The Commission was notified on February 1, 1996. Id.
27 European Union's Court Ruling on Gender-based Affirmative Action, THE
WEEK IN GERMANY, Oct. 20, 1995, at 4, located in wolfh@osuunx.ucc.okstate.edu (on
file with author).
218 Social Policy: Experts Call for EU Treaty to Address Equal Opportunities,
supra note 234.
*9 EU:EP/Social Affairs, AGENCE EUR., May 15, 1996.
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pean women in the workplace.24
C. Spain
According to Lucie Ruano Rodrigues, a member of Spain's
Economic and Social Committee, the ECJ "lacked valid legal
motivations.""4 She asserts that instruments such as quotas are
effective in achieving equality between the sexes and challenges
the court's finding that the Bremen quota system was "absolute
and unconditional."242 Finally, declaring that the opinion is
"easily attackable" and lacking in any legal basis, she questions
whether the court may have had political motivations behind the
judgment.243
D. Norway
The Norwegian government, although subject to the juris-
diction of the ECJ as a member of the European Economic Area,
"has declared its intention to ignore" the Kalanke decision and
maintain its regulations.2" "In rejecting the ECJ's ruling, Nor-
way is essentially sending a message that it will not accept ex-
ternal court rulings significantly at odds with the country's core
gender laws, which are regarded as the most progressive of any
Western nation."2 The Norwegian government, although legally
compelled to follow the Court's decisions, has tried to justify its
rejection of the decision by contending that only the fifteen
Member States of the European Union are required to accept the
ruling. 6 Citizens in Norway do not believe that the government
should adjust their progressive gender laws247 simply to comply
with a ruling from the ECJ. 248 The belief of many is that
240 Id. Ms. Hauffe has noted that only 2 to 8% of women occupy senior positions
and that even fewer women have high positions such as judges. Id. She argues that
rather than being a progressive change, the amended Directive hinders the principle
of quotas and is a step backwards. Id.
241 Id.
242 EU:EP/Social Affairs, supra note 239. Rodrigues also notes that the ruling
fails to take account of indirect discrimination. See also Social Policy: Experts Call
for EU Treaty to Address Equal Opportunities, supra note 234.
242 EU:EP Social Affaris, supra note 239.
244 O'Dwyer, supra note 87.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Norway's Gender Equality Act requires employers to "favor women when
men and women candidates have the same qualifications." Id.
248 Id. (quoting Norwegian government official stating that "[als a woman I am
1997]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:591
"Norway is not about to undo years of hard work by bending its
knee to an external court.
249
E. The United Kingdom
The Kalanke decision has not been met with such hostility in
other Member States. In England for example, Mr. Jepson, a
member of the Labour Party, saw an advertisement inviting fe-
males to be candidates in two new constituencies of the Labour
Party. He applied for the two positions, but was rejected because
both positions had women-only shortlists.250 Mr. Jepson sought
relief in an industrial tribunal and used the Kalanke decision to
argue that the Labour Party's policy violated the law."' Ruling
against the Labour Party, the tribunal found that if the positive
discrimination found in the Bremen Act was unlawful, "then a
'total block' on men, as in Labour's policy, would also be against
European law." 2
The British reaction to the Kalanke decision may be the
happy with Norwegian law in this area .... There is certainly no reason to change
our law to adjust with the court's ruling and I doubt if any Scandinavian country
will do so .... This sort of directive is far behind the times .... It hasn't kept up with
developments in gender legislation") (internal quotations omitted).
211 O'Dwyer, supra note 87. Several members of the Norwegian government
were quoted as stating
In Norway, we regard the ECJ's ruling as a purely European Union matter
.... We feel that Norway's national laws are more progressive and should
always rule against external legal changes.
Norwegians would not stand for outside interference on this issue, espe-
cially since the laws we have in this area are fair and work very well.
It would be entirely absurd if Norway were forced to change its laws just to
suit the whims of a court in Luxembourg .... We will retain our national
laws on affirmative action quotas, and there can be no question of not do-
ing so. To do otherwise would be tantamount to the State abandoning
Norway's women.
Id. (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, the expectation is that the other Scan-
dinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark, and Finland) will not support the ruling or
any attempt by the ECJ to enforce it. Id.
250 John Rentoul & Donald Macintyre, The Battle for a Principle, THE INDEP.,
Jan. 9, 1996, at 2.
21 Id. (Dyas-Elliot & Jepson v. Labour Party).
252 Id. The tribunal did note, however, that Directive 76/207 was not "directly
applicable since the respondents were not emanations of the State." Putting a New
Spin on Applications for Silk, THE LAW., Feb. 13, 1996, at 13. The tribunal, citing
the Kalanke decision, also rejected the Labour Party's argument that the women-
only shortlists were covered by the Directive which allows for certain "positive ac-
tion" measures. Id.
THE EFFECT OF KALANKE DECISION
most interesting one to observe. Although in this specific in-
stance the British judiciary has been amenable to the court's de-
cision, on the whole, it wishes to restrict the powers of the
ECJ. 13 In fact, the British government has recently stated that
it is "prepared to ignore a European law."254 Government offi-
cials have explained that recent interpretations of the Court
went "beyond what governments intended when laws were
framed" and were "absurd."5 The Prime Minister has "attacked
the European court for beginning to become a European
'supreme court' and has "left open the possibility that Britain
might disobey its rulings if the social chapter is forced upon"
Britain.256 Many British feel powerless in the European law-
making process, yet are aware that "there are no Euro-police to
enforce the law against either [the] Government or the subjects
of the Queen." 7
It is submitted that the British use decisions of the ECJ
when such rulings fit within Britain's desired social programs. If
the decisions are controversial or conflict with its desired social
policy, it is not difficult for the courts and the government to ei-
!3 See The Future of Europe, supra note 57 ("Britain wants to restrict the role of
the European Court of Justice and to ensure that judicial matters remain the prov-
ince of national governments acting in unanimity. Other countries want to give the
Commission a wider role and do more to harmonise judicial systems."); see also Re-
becca Smithers, IGC Debate Reopens Tory Wounds, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 22, 1996
(noting that while other EU countries have ignored European legislation, in past
England has been scrupulous in upholding European law as its own).
2" Nicholas Budgen, EU Law Must Be Disobeyed, THE TIMES OF LONDON, Mar.
20, 1996 (noting however, that other EU countries have turned "a blind eye to Euro-
pean legislation" but that in past "British have been scrupulous in treating Euro-
pean law with the same importance as domestic law").
2' Smithers, supra note 253 (internal quotations omitted). See also Barbash,
supra note 200 (calling ECJ decision "an outrage" and asserting "I am not aware
that a decision was ever made by the British people" that "a bunch of foreign judges
and not ... the elected representatives of the British people" should be making such
choices).
2" Budgen, supra note 254; see also Barbash, supra note 200 (noting that notion
of "international judiciary empowered to overrule acts of Congress may be unimag-
inable to Americans" but that "such a court--a supreme court of Europe--is increas-
ingly active within the European Union .... "); Smithers, supra note 253 (quoting
government official that ECJ's "powers are excessive and need to be cut back if Par-
liament is to do its job and speak for the British people").
117 Budgen, supra note 254 (noting that there is no fear of enforcement). At least
one subject of the Queen believes that "[tihe EU is at present a half-formed federal
structure. It offers neither sovereignty to the member state, nor a system of defined
roles and checks and balances. If we cannot change the treaty, we can at least defy
the judicial messengers." Id.
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ther simply dismiss the ruling, or publicly justify a reason why
the ECJ ruling does not affect British law. It is further asserted
that the British are not alone in doing so.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the concept of positive discrimination is a
controversial topic. Many citizens of the Community believe that
positive discrimination in the form of quotas is an effective way
to eliminate the unequal status of women in both rank and re-
muneration in the workplace. They feel that without such pro-
grams, women will be indefinitely relegated to low-level, poorly
paid positions. Finally, they note that since Member States are
allowed to implement directives as appropriate to their domestic
situation, they ought to be able to adopt positive discrimination
programs in the form of quotas. On the other hand, some citizens
of the Community feel just as strongly that positive discrimina-
tion programs simply discriminate against groups not included
within the programs. A decision as to whether to legislate posi-
tive discrimination procedures goes to the very root of a nation's
social policy.
The basic issue that faces the Member States of the EU is
whether together, they are committed to establishing a uniform
social policy. The original purpose of the Community was to es-
tablish a common market. Issues such as equal treatment for
men and women in the workplace do affect issues dealing with
the establishment of a Common Market; however, they are also
deeply rooted in social programs, culture, and basic politics of
Member States. If Member States decide that it is desirable to
unify such programs, then the Court must be made truly inde-
pendent, with the power and authority to ensure that its deci-
sions are followed.25 It is possible, however, that Europeans are
not ready for a supranational entity to dictate what a Member
State's social policy may or may not be. If it is determined that
the future of a Common Market should not include an homogeni-
zation of social programs, then the limited powers of the Court to
rule on such issues should be curtailed. The present situation is
not ideal and undermines the integrity of the Court and the EU
"" One of the basic problems with the ECJ is that it is not truly an independent
court. See David Howell, The Right Referendum Strategy for Britain, WALL ST. J.
(Europe), Mar. 25, 1996, at 10.
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as a whole.
The Kalanke decision will certainly have a direct effect on
the candidates for the job in the Bremen Parks Department since
both applicants must reapply for the position. Moreover, it is
possible that the ruling may influence the courts of the Member
States. 9 As of now, however, it is not only unclear what the
citizens of the Member States will do with the decision, it is also
unclear as to what the small city of Bremen will do.
Laura Molinari
2" Justice Reversed: European Union, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 1996, at 52.
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